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Abstract—Modern market management systems continue to 
evolve due to the intentions to improve system security and 
reliability. This evolvement has been leading to a transition of 
market auction models from a deterministic structure with 
approximations on the reliability criteria (e.g., acquirement of 
contingency reserve through proxy reserve policies) to explicit 
representation of contingencies (e.g., estimation of post-
contingency states via participation factors and stochastic 
programming). This paper proposes a comprehensive framework 
to establish various procedures for evaluating: (i) transparency 
and incentive compatibility of different contingency modeling 
approaches, and (ii) efficiency of two possible stochastic market 
designs. First, the concept of securitized LMP is presented to solve 
the issue of how market participants should be compensated for 
providing N-1 reliability services. Then, pricing implications and 
settlements of three market models are compared: (i) a 
deterministic market model with proxy serve policies, (ii) state-of-
the-art market models with estimated post-contingency states, and 
(iii) a two-stage stochastic market model. Second, this paper 
evaluates two stochastic market models while accounting for 
potential adjustments from day-ahead scheduling to real-time 
operation: (i) minimizing expected operating cost of all N-1 
scenarios, and (ii) minimizing the base-case (or no contingency) 
cost. These analyses are conducted on IEEE 118-bus test system. 
 
Index Terms— Locational marginal price, market design, 
market settlements, N-1 reliability, stochastic market model. 
NOMENCLATURE 
Sets and Indices 
𝑐 Index of operating state; 0 for the base-case, non-
zero for contingencies. 
𝐶0, 𝐶𝑔, 𝐶𝑘 Set of scenarios representing base-case, 
generator, and line contingencies, respectively. 
𝑔 Index of generators, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺. 
𝑔(𝑛) Set of generators connected to node n. 
k, ℓ Index of transmission lines, 𝑘, ℓ ∈ 𝐾. 
n Index of buses, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁. 
t Index of time periods, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇. 
Parameters 
𝑐𝑔
𝑁𝐿 , 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝐷 , 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝑈 No-load, shutdown and startup costs of unit 𝑔. 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑡  Load at bus 𝑛 at time period 𝑡. 
?̅?𝑔, ?̅?𝑔, ?̅?𝑔 Day-ahead scheduled power output, 
commitment, and contingency reserve of unit 𝑔. 
𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛 Maximum output and minimum output of unit 𝑔. 
𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑐𝑛𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓
 Power transfer distribution factor during 
operating state 𝑐 for line 𝑘 for an injection at n. 
𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐹𝑘ℓ
𝑟𝑒𝑓
 Line outage distribution factor representing the 
change in flow on line 𝑘 for outage of line 𝑙. 
𝑐𝑔
𝑝
 Variable cost of unit 𝑔 ($/MWh). 
𝑁1𝑘 N-1 contingency indicator of transmission line 𝑘; 0 
for a contingency on line 𝑘; otherwise, 1. 
𝑁1𝑔 N-1 contingency indicator of generator 𝑔; 0 for a 
contingency on generator 𝑔; otherwise, 1. 
𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅, 𝑅𝑔
10 Hourly and 10-min ramp rates of unit 𝑔. 
𝑅𝑔
𝑆𝑈 , 𝑅𝑔
𝑆𝐷 Startup and shutdown ramp rates of unit 𝑔. 
𝑈𝑇𝑔, 𝐷𝑇𝑔 Minimum up time and down time of unit 𝑔. 
𝜋𝐵𝐶  Probability of base-case operating state. 
𝜋𝑐 Probability of contingency operating state 𝑐. 
𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 Thermal rating of transmission line k. 
𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐
 Emergency thermal rating of transmission line 𝑘. 
Variables 
𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑡  Output of unit 𝑔 for operating state 𝑐 at period 𝑡. 
𝑃𝑛𝑐𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
 Net power injection at bus 𝑛 for operating state 𝑐 at 
period 𝑡. 
𝐹𝐿0𝑙𝑡 Flow on transmission line 𝑙 at period 𝑡. 
𝑟𝑔𝑡 Contingency reserve of unit 𝑔 at period 𝑡. 
𝑢𝑔𝑡 Unit commitment variable for unit 𝑔 at period 𝑡. 
𝑣𝑔𝑡, 𝑤𝑔𝑡  Startup and shutdown variables for unit 𝑔 at period 𝑡. 
𝑑𝑛𝑡 Demand at bus 𝑛 at period 𝑡. 
𝜆𝑛𝑐𝑡 Locational marginal price at bus 𝑛 for operating 
state time 𝑐 at period 𝑡. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
LECTRIC systems are considered the greatest 
achievement of the 20th century by the National Academy 
of Engineering [1]. Operational scheduling of this sophisticated 
engineering system necessitates consideration of both 
economical and reliability aspects. However, due to its 
complexity, it is non-trivial to model all system components, 
capture detailed characteristics of all system assets, and satisfy 
all reliability requirements all together. Hence, existing 
operational scheduling models are designed with 
approximations, e.g., DC approximation of power flow and 
approximations of the N-1 reliability mandate (i.e., loss of a 
single element, e.g. a generator or a non-radial transmission 
asset,  should not cause involuntary load shedding [2]). This 
mandate makes underlying market model stochastic in nature.  
Some of the existing electricity market operators solve day-
ahead (DA) security-constrained unit commitment (SCUC) 
models with an approximation of the N-1 reliability mandate 
via a proxy reserve requirement [3], where total of contingency 
reserves across the power system is forced to be greater than a 
certain threshold. Such SCUC models do not account for and 
guarantee post-contingency reserve deliverability.  
Furthermore, some other operators, e.g. Midcontinent 
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independent system operator (MISO), model zonal reserve 
requirements [4]. This model is unable to differentiate the 
generators within each zone regardless of their ability or 
inability to deploy reserve due to transmission system 
congestion. To compensate for the approximations in market 
models, the operator may intervene and make adjustments in 
the market solutions. Such interventions are referred to as out-
of-market corrections (OMC) [5] or exceptional dispatches [6] 
which include committing additional generation units or 
redispatching committed units. After an N-1 reliable dispatch 
solution is obtained, the settlements are calculated. The existing 
practice to calculate market settlements is to use the locational 
marginal prices (LMPs) from the DA SCUC (which have not 
been affected by the OMC) and the modified N-1 reliable 
dispatch solution [6]. Such market models are unable to account 
for the true value of reserve provided by each generator in a 
nodal basis and consequently might not incentivize resources to 
do as directed by the market. These inabilities to impact market 
prices will lead to a missing money problem (i.e., insufficient 
compensation received by generators) and cause a natural 
unfairness as market participants might not be dispatched fairly 
with these pricing schemes.  
In the electricity markets, compensation mechanisms are still 
a subject of debate. Some ISOs have capacity market auctions 
with estimated peak load and peak period prices in an attempt 
to compensate market participants for providing reliability 
services during peak periods [7]. Others, such as MISO, use 
convex hull pricing, which is an alternative pricing scheme in 
non-convex markets to clear the market while also minimizing 
the total uplift payments [8]. While these approaches are 
developed in an attempt to improve compensation mechanisms, 
the issue still persists; existing pricing schemes do not 
sufficiently reflect the true value of providing energy during 
contingencies, as these uncertain events are not explicitly 
included in the market models.  
Explicit representation of the contingencies via a two-stage 
stochastic extensive-form SCUC (ESCUC) enables inclusion of 
value of reliability services into the LMPs and can reduce the 
missing money problem. ESCUC optimizes the recourse 
decision variables (or corrective actions) while explicitly 
considering the network constraints for the post-contingency 
state, which ensures nodal reserve deployment considering 
physical network limitations. Pricing analyses for stochastic 
security-constrained approaches in the energy and reserve 
markets are presented in [9]–[12]. Reference [9] investigates a 
method to compensate generators for energy and reserve. The 
authors in [9] derive a pricing mechanism where the generators 
are compensated for the modeled N-1 scenarios. However, 
results are shown for only a single time period while the 
formulated model allows for load shedding through a fixed cost. 
It is worth noting that the fixed cost of load shedding is hard to 
estimate since (1) it is not necessarily proportional to bids 
submitted to the market as energy bids, and (2) it is not the same 
(fixed cost) for different sectors (industry, domestic, 
commercial).  The authors in [10] and [11] formulate a multi-
period stochastic SCUC model that takes into account the post-
contingency states for pre-selected contingencies, while 
allowing load-shedding. In [12], the authors utilize a two-stage 
stochastic linear program to propose different methods to 
compensate generators. The models presented in [9]–[12] allow 
for load-shedding through the value-of-lost-load (VOLL); 
however, this approach is subjective since the obtained results 
are sensitive to the choice of VOLL. Additionally, a 
comprehensive economic evaluation (e.g., generation revenue, 
generation rent, load payment, and congestion rent) for the 
stochastic two-stage SCUC and its comparison with other 
contingency modeling approaches have neither been included 
nor analyzed in prior work.  
In addition, prior work proposed approaches based on the 
estimated post-contingency states using pre-determined 
participation factors. These approaches fill the gap between the 
traditional deterministic and the stochastic models by explicitly 
representing contingencies without any second-stage recourse 
decisions. For instance, line outage distribution factors 
(LODFs) can be used to explicitly model the transmission line 
contingencies [13]. Another example is CAISO, which intends 
to explicitly enforce the post-contingency transmission 
constraints for the generator contingencies using generator loss 
distribution factors (GDF) [14]. Also [15] and [16] have 
proposed a set of G-1 security constraints, thereby, contingency 
reserves are allocated more efficiently in the system with 
respect to post-contingency dispatch feasibility. With the 
explicit modeling of contingency events within the state-of-the-
art market auction models, the industry is actually moving from 
the deterministic market models to a stochastic model. With 
such stochastic modeling, it is desirable for LMPs to reflect the 
value and quality of services provided by market participants in 
response to contingencies. However, there are unsolved issues 
regardless of the choice of uncertainty modeling: generators 
compensation for providing N-1 reliability services as well as 
impact of contingency modeling on prices.  
Apart from the above issue, in the context of stochastic 
market designs, majority of prior work adopt an objective 
function that optimizes the base-case along with the expected 
cost of the post-contingency states [10], [12], [17]–[19]. 
However, there is a number of reasons why optimizing over an 
expected cost may not be the best choice. Firstly, during 
emergency conditions in real-time (RT), the operator may not 
exactly follow the proposed corrective actions since the 
intention during an emergency condition is not to minimize 
cost; rather, the goal is to recover from the event as quickly as 
possible to prevent future unforeseen problems that could lead 
to cascading outages. Furthermore, it is difficult to accurately 
predict the probability of outages, which itself can lead to 
different pricing implications and market solutions. There are 
other studies [9], [20], and [21] that minimize the base-case 
costs as their objective functions, while the model is still a 
stochastic two-stage SCUC with explicit representation of post-
contingency states. References [9], [10], [12], [17]–[21] aim to 
improve stochastic market  models, whereas the proper design 
of objective function for these models has neither been analyzed 
nor included in prior work. 
The above literature survey reveals a few gaps that need 
additional attention and further work. To the best of authors’ 
knowledge, very limited efforts have been done on how various 
choices of modeling contingency events affect the potential 
operational efficiency, incentive compatibility, market 
transparency, and market settlement policies in the markets 
with inherent stochastic nature. In addition, no prior work has 
been conducted about how to formulate the objective function 
that maintains efficiency for the stochastic markets with the 
uncertain contingency events. The primary contributions of this 
work are as follows: 
• Impacts of contingency modeling strategies on electricity 
market outcomes, pricing, and settlements are analyzed. 
This paper leverages the duality theory to calculate LMP in 
a stochastic market model; this theoretical method 
confirms that the value of providing N-1 reliability services 
can be reflected in the LMPs of such stochastic market 
models. This pricing scheme is then compared to two state-
of-the-art market auction models, where achieving N-1 
reliable dispatch is postponed to OMC. Also, the market 
settlements of these models are calculated and compared. 
With these analyses, this paper seeks to inform market 
stakeholders about the impacts of contingency modeling 
approaches in the DA market process and their 
implications on pricing and settlements.  
• The choices of objective function for the stochastic market 
models are analyzed; a stochastic market design with an 
expected cost objective function is examined and 
compared with the base-case costs minimization objective 
function from two aspects: (i) realized cost during N-1 
contingencies and (ii) effects of inaccurate calculation of 
the probabilities on market outcomes. 
It is worth noting that the aim of this paper is not to develop 
a new market design; it is rather to propose a framework to 
evaluate existing market models and stochastic market models 
in terms of potential operational efficiency, incentive 
compatibility, fair pricing, and transparency. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
presents model formulation. Section III focuses on pricing 
implication of contingency modeling approaches. Section IV 
evaluates choices of objective function for stochastic market 
frameworks. Finally, section V concludes the paper. 
II. MODEL FORMULATION 
Previous studies in the area of managing discrete uncertain 
events (i.e., contingencies) in the SCUC problem can be 
categorized as follows: (i) proxy reserve policies, (ii) modeling 
system response via participation factors, e.g. LODF and GDF, 
(iii) stochastic programming approaches, e.g., ESCUC, and (iv) 
chance-constrained optimization and robust optimization. The 
main focus of this work is on managing uncertainty through (i), 
(ii), and (iii) above. In the following three subsections, model 
formulations related to these approaches are presented.  
A. SCUC with deterministic proxy reserve requirement 
A SCUC market model with deterministic proxy reserve 
requirement is presented in (1)-(19), which is similar to the 
model in [15]. The objective function, minimizing total 
operating costs, is presented in (1). In this formulation, 
constraints (2) and (3) model the relationship of the unit 
commitment variables with the startup and shutdown variables, 
respectively. Constraints (4)-(7) model the binary commitment 
(𝑢𝑔𝑡) decision and the startup (𝑣𝑔𝑡) and shutdown (𝑤𝑔𝑡) 
decisions, respectively. Minimum up and down time constraints 
are enforced by (8) and (9). Constraints (10) and (11) ensure 
ramp rate limits. Constraint (12) guarantees balance between 
the power injection and withdrawal at every bus and constraint 
(13) ensures the energy balance between load and generation 
across the system. Constraint (14) models the transmission line 
limits. The generator output limits are presented by (15) and 
(16), while constraint (17) limits the spinning reserve to the 10-
minute generators’ ramp rate capability. Proxy reserve 
requirements are modeled through (18)-(19). 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑔
𝑝𝑃𝑔0𝑡𝑡𝑔 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑁𝐿𝑢𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝑈𝑣𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝐷𝑤𝑔𝑡) (1) 
Subject to 
𝑣𝑔𝑡 ≥ 𝑢𝑔𝑡 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡−1, ∀𝑔, 𝑡 ≥ 2 (2) 
𝑤𝑔𝑡 ≥ 𝑢𝑔𝑡−1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡, ∀𝑔, 𝑡 ≥ 2 (3) 
𝑣𝑔𝑡 ≥ 𝑢𝑔𝑡  , 𝑤𝑔𝑡 = 0, ∀𝑔, 𝑡 = 1 (4) 
0 ≤ 𝑣𝑔𝑡 ≤ 1 , ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (5) 
0 ≤ 𝑤𝑔𝑡 ≤ 1 , ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (6) 
𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (7) 
∑ 𝑣𝑔𝑠
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝑈𝑇𝑔+1
≤ 𝑢𝑔𝑡, ∀𝑔, t ≥ 𝑈𝑇𝑔 (8) 
∑ 𝑤𝑔𝑠
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝐷𝑇𝑔+1
≤ 1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑡, ∀𝑔, 𝑡 ≥ 𝐷𝑇𝑔 (9) 
𝑃𝑔0𝑡 − 𝑃𝑔0𝑡−1 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅𝑢𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑔
𝑆𝑈𝑣𝑔𝑡, ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (10) 
𝑃𝑔0𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑔0𝑡 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
𝐻𝑅𝑢𝑔𝑡 + 𝑅𝑔
𝑆𝐷𝑤𝑔𝑡 , ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (11) 
∑ 𝑃𝑔0𝑡𝑔𝜖𝑔(𝑛) − 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑡 = 𝑃𝑛0𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
, ∀𝑛, 𝑡 (12) 
∑ 𝑃𝑛0𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑛 = 0, ∀𝑐, 𝑡 (13) 
−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ ∑ 𝑃𝑛0𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑛 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹0𝑛𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥, ∀𝑘, 𝑡 (14) 
𝑃𝑔0𝑡 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢𝑔𝑡, ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (15) 
𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑢𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑔0𝑡 , ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (16) 
0 ≤ 𝑟𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
10𝑢𝑔𝑡, ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (17) 
∑ 𝑟𝑗𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑔0𝑡 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡𝑗∈𝐺 , ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (18) 
∑ 𝑟𝑔𝑡 ≥ 𝜂% ∑ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑡𝑛𝑔 , ∀𝑡 (19) 
B. SCUC with line contingency modeling using LODF 
Today, some ISOs use LODF to explicitly model non-radial 
line contingencies in the DA SCUC model without adding any 
second-stage recourse variables [13]. The LODFs are 
participation factors, which indicate redistribution of flow on 
the transmission lines (e.g., line 𝑘) after outage of a line (e.g., 
line ℓ) [5]. The SCUC model that incorporates explicit 
representation of the transmission contingency using LODF is 
presented  in (20)-(23). 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑔
𝑝𝑃𝑔0𝑡𝑡𝑔 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑁𝐿𝑢𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝑈𝑣𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝐷𝑤𝑔𝑡) (20) 
Subject to 
Constraints (2)-(19) (21) 
−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐 ≤ ∑ 𝑃𝑛0𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑛 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹0𝑛𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓 + 𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐹𝑘ℓ
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝐹𝐿0𝑙𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐
, 
∀𝑘 ≠ ℓ, 𝑡  (22) 
𝐹𝐿0𝑙𝑡 = ∑ 𝑃𝑛0𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑛 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹0𝑛𝑙
𝑟𝑒𝑓
, ∀ℓ, 𝑡 (23) 
C. ESCUC market model 
The ESCUC problem is formulated as a two-stage stochastic 
program. The scenarios represent base-case pre-contingency 
scenario and contingency scenarios (i.e., the loss of non-radial 
transmission line and generator) with their corresponding 
probabilities. This market model is defined by (24)-(35). 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∑ ∑ 𝜋𝐵𝐶𝑐𝑔
𝑝𝑃𝑔0𝑡𝑡𝑔 + ∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑔
𝑁𝐿𝑢𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝑈𝑣𝑔𝑡 +𝑡𝑔
𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝐷𝑤𝑔𝑡) + ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑔
𝑝𝑃𝑔c𝑡𝑡𝑐≠𝐶0𝑔  (24) 
Subject to 
Constraints (2)-(11) and (15) (25) 
∑ 𝑃𝑔0𝑡𝑔𝜖𝑔(𝑛) − 𝑑𝑛𝑡 = 𝑃𝑛0𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
, ∀𝑛, 𝑡 [𝜆𝑛0𝑡] (26a) 
∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑡𝑔𝜖𝑔(𝑛) − 𝑑𝑛𝑡 = 𝑃𝑛𝑐𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
, ∀𝑛, 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑔, 𝑡 [𝜆𝑛𝑐𝑡] (26b) 
∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑡𝑔𝜖𝑔(𝑛) − 𝑑𝑛𝑡 = 𝑃𝑛𝑐𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
, ∀𝑛, 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑘, 𝑡 [𝜆𝑛𝑐𝑡] (26c) 
𝑑𝑛𝑡 = 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑡, ∀𝑔, 𝑡 [𝜆𝑛𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑] (27) 
∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑐𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑛 = 0, ∀𝑐, 𝑡 (28) 
−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ ∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑐𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑛 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹0𝑛𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥, ∀𝑘, 𝑐 ≠ 𝐶𝑘 , 𝑡 (29) 
−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐𝑁1𝑘 ≤ ∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑐𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑛 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑐𝑛𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
max,𝑐𝑁1𝑘, ∀𝑘, 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑘, 𝑡 
 (30) 
𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑁1𝑔 ≤ 𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢𝑔𝑡𝑁1𝑔, ∀𝑔, 𝑐, 𝑡 (31) 
𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑡 − 𝑃𝑔0𝑡 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
10𝑢𝑔𝑡  , ∀𝑔: 𝑔 ≠ 𝑐, 𝑐, 𝑡 (32) 
𝑃𝑔0𝑡 − 𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑡 ≤ 𝑅𝑔
10𝑢𝑔𝑡, ∀𝑔: 𝑔 ≠ 𝑐, 𝑐, 𝑡 (33) 
𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑡 − 𝑃𝑔0𝑡 ≤ 𝑟𝑔𝑡 , ∀𝑔: 𝑔 ≠ 𝑐, 𝑐, 𝑡 (34) 
𝑃𝑔0𝑡 − 𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑡 ≤ 𝑟𝑔𝑡 , ∀𝑔: 𝑔 ≠ 𝑐, 𝑐, 𝑡 (35) 
In the above formulation, the objective is to minimize the 
expected operating cost over a set of uncertain scenarios as 
presented in (24). The node balance constraint (see (26a-c)) is 
separated to distinguish when the constraint represents the base-
case (26a), G-1 generation contingency scenarios (26b), and 
finally T-1 transmission contingency scenarios (26c). 
Constraint (28) enforces energy balance between the supply and 
the demand at the system level. Transmission line capacity limit 
for the base-case scenario and the G-1 generation contingency 
scenarios is constrained by (29), whereas that for T-1 
transmission contingency scenarios is imposed by (30). The 
generator output limit constraint is represented by (31). Finally, 
deviation of an online generator output level (see (32)-(35)) 
from the base-case dispatch to the post-contingency dispatch is 
limited by its reserve (𝑟𝑔𝑡) and by its 10-minute ramp rate (𝑅𝑔
10). 
Note that for each scenario, only one of 𝑁1𝑘 and 𝑁1𝑔 is set to 
0 while the rest is set to 1. 
III. PRICING IMPLICATIONS OF CONTINGENCY MODELING 
APPROACHES  
The market model presented in Sections II.A and II.B give 
market solutions which may not be N-1 and G-1 reliable, 
respectively. To achieve N-1 reliable solutions, the market 
operators implement OMC on their market solutions [6]. To 
replicate this practice, this paper implements OMC on the 
output of market models from Sections II.A and II. B. The OMC 
approach used in this work is similar to [6], [15] and [22]. In 
this approach, the generation units that are committed in the DA 
SCUC market model are not allowed to be de-committed, and 
their dispatches are limited to the original approximated DA 
solution by their 10-minute ramp rate limit. However, 
modifying the dispatch and the commitment of additional units 
is allowed in order to ensure reliable operation.  
After an N-1 reliable dispatch solution is obtained through 
OMC approach, the settlements are calculated using DA market 
LMP [6]. However, these settlements may not reflect the true 
value of N-1 reliability services due to the discrepancy between 
LMP calculation and final dispatch solution. Thus, such 
practice may not be incentive compatible for market 
participants, especially those who provide reliability services.  
On the other hand, since all contingencies are represented 
endogenously in the ESCUC market model (Section II.C), the 
obtained solution is expected to be N-1 reliable. For this model, 
a pricing mechanism can be obtained to properly incentivize all 
market participants for providing energy and contingency 
reserve. In this paper, the concept of securitized LMP (SLMP) 
is presented to better capture the value of reliability services. 
The SLMP is the dual variable of (27), i.e., 𝜆𝑛𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 . Since 
ESCUC model is a mixed-integer linear program, its dual 
formulation is not well-defined. However, after fixing the 
binary variables to their values at the best solution found, the 
linear model of ESCUC is achieved, which has a well-defined 
dual formulation. Equation (36) is obtained by deriving the dual 
formulation from the ESCUC linear primal problem, which 
shows the relationship between LMPs from the base-case (26a), 
contingency scenarios (26b)-(26c), and the SLMP. 
𝜆𝑛𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 = 𝜆𝑛0𝑡 + ∑ 𝜆𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑐∈𝐶𝑔 + ∑ 𝜆𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑐∈𝐶𝑘 , ∀𝑛, 𝑡 (36) 
It is worth mentioning that to obtain the relation presented in 
(36), the demand is treated as a variable in (26a-c), and the 
model enforces 𝑑𝑛𝑡 = 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑡 in (27). The first term in the 
right-hand side of (36) represents energy and congestion 
components of SLMP in pre-contingency state, while the 
second and third terms represent energy and congestion 
components of SLMP in post-contingency states for the 
generators and non-radial transmission lines contingencies, 
respectively. Therefore, the SLMP inherently captures the true 
value of reserves in the post-contingency state on a nodal basis. 
The pricing scheme presented here from the ESCUC market 
model has the advantage that it permits the ISOs to gauge how 
the market participants should be compensated for providing 
contingency-based reserve.  
The market settlements are compared for three market 
models, i.e., models in Sections II. A, II. B, and II.C. Fig. 1 
illustrates the procedure for comparing these market models.  
Out-of-market corrections
Comparing results
Settlements: LMPs 
of model I and 
dispatch after OMC 
Settlements: LMPs 
of model II and 
dispatch after OMC 
Settlements: SLMPs 
and dispatch of 
model III  
Model I: SCUC 
with Proxy reserve  
Model II: SCUC 
with LODF   
Model III: 
ESCUC 
 
Fig. 1: Procedure for pricing implications comparison of market models. 
A. Testing & Results of pricing implication 
CPLEX v12.8 are used to perform all simulations on a 
computer with an Intel Core i7 CPU @ 2.20 GHz, 16 GB RAM, 
and 64-bit operating system. A modified 118-bus IEEE test 
system [23] is used to implement the market auction models, 
which has 54 generators, 186 lines (177 non-radial), and 91 
loads. Set 𝐶𝑔 and 𝐶𝑘 include N-1 contingencies for all 
generators and non-radial transmission line elements, 
respectively. Consequently, there are 232 scenarios modeled in 
the ESCUC market auction model, including the base-case 
scenario, 54 generator contingencies and 177 non-radial 
transmission line contingencies. The probability of 
contingencies is calculated from historical failure rates [24]. 
The probability of base-case is considered to be 0.946 (i.e., 
𝜋𝐵𝐶=0.946) in order to make the summation of probabilities 
over all scenarios equals to 1. The relative MIP gap is set to 0%. 
The three market auction models, i.e., SCUC with proxy reserve 
requirements (abbreviated as “SCUC-Prxy”), SCUC with 
transmission contingency modeled using LODF (abbreviated as 
“SCUC-LODF”), and ESCUC (abbreviated as “SCUC-Extsv”), 
are compared in terms of operational cost, incentive 
compatibility, and market settlements.  
 
Fig. 2: Final costs comparison for N − 1 reliable solutions. 
Fig. 2 compares the final costs for the different market 
auction models. This cost includes the SCUC cost and OMC 
cost. OMC is not performed for SCUC-Extsv as this model 
explicitly represents contingencies using recourse decision 
variables and produces an N-1 reliable solution. The solution of 
the SCUC-Extsv market auction model has the lowest final cost 
(benchmark solution) since its scheduled reserve is deliverable 
in post-contingency states. The SCUC-LODF results in higher 
SCUC cost compared to the SCUC-Prxy, but it requires less 
discretionary changes or uneconomic adjustments (OMC 
actions) to achieve N-1 reliability; thus, the SCUC-LODF 
results in less OMC cost. From the reliability point of view, it 
can be concluded that the SCUC-LODF provides a solution that 
is closer to N-1 reliable SCUC-Extsv solution. 
LMPs of the market models are studied in Fig. 3 for hour 22 
across the buses. Based on this figure, as the market model 
moves away from SCUC-Prxy toward capturing more accurate 
representation of the contingency events, the prices are 
increased from bus #67 to bus #109, and also are mostly higher 
in bus #1-67. The difference between prices is due to the new 
elements of LMP, i.e., marginal security elements, which 
represent the value of reserve provision in the modeled 
contingencies. More specifically, the deterministic model, 
which utilizes proxy reserve to achieve N-1 reliability, does not 
capture the true value of achieving N-1 reliability due to the fact 
that the obtained market LMPs do not adequately reflect the 
value of delivering reserve in the post-contingency state. 
Accordingly, the LMPs tend to be lower in this model. In this 
case, the new committed units after OMC may not be fully 
compensated for providing ancillary services, which can be a 
reason of missing money issue. This will cause a natural 
unfairness in market strategy as  market participants might not 
be compensated fairly with this mechanism. On the other hand, 
the SCUC-Extsv inherently captures the different values of 
reserves offered by various entities, as it reflects the value of 
delivering reserve in the post-contingency state on a locational 
basis, so the SLMPs tend to be higher. This result occurs 
because the model explicitly checks to see whether the reserve 
is deliverable for each contingency. Overall, these analyses 
confirm that with more accurate representation of 
contingencies in the market auction models, the reliability and 
associated products are priced more accurately. This would 
result in fair and accurate market signals for market participants 
and improve overall market efficiency. 
Fig. 4 compares the market auction models with respect to 
market settlements. It can be seen that the generators revenue 
and load payment have the highest values with the SCUC-Extsv 
model, while they have the lowest value with the SCUC-Prxy. 
The generation rent is calculated from subtracting variable cost 
of units from their revenues, which also increases as the models 
have more explicit and accurate representation of the 
contingency events. From these results, it can be said that more 
accurate modeling of N-1 requirement in market models results 
in increased profit of generators. 
 
Fig. 3: Pricing comparison of SCUC-Prxy, SCUC-LODF, and SCUC-Extsv. 
 
Fig. 4: Settlements for different market action models.  
IV. OBJECTIVE FUNCTION DESIGN AND FORMULATION 
EVALUATION FOR STOCHASTIC MARKET MODELS 
ESCUC model presented by (24)-(35) minimizes the 
expected cost of all scenarios (called ESCUC-expected model 
in rest of this paper), as presented in (24). However, during 
emergency conditions in RT, the system operators implement 
corrective actions, which are aimed to eliminate violations  as 
quickly as possible (not to minimize operation cost) in order to 
recover from the contingency and to regain N-1 reliability. 
These corrective actions may not necessarily be the lowest cost 
options. Thus, minimizing post-contingency cost in the DA 
may result in a solution, which anyways will not be fully 
implemented. This discrepancy can result in inefficiency of 
stochastic market model with expected cost minimization 
objective. Furthermore, minimizing expected cost may result in 
deviation of the base-case schedule, which has the highest 
probability of occurrence, from its optimal solution. In short, 
such models may generate operational schedules with higher 
base-case cost with no guarantee of reducing operating costs 
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during contingencies. Additionally, inaccurate estimation of the 
probability of the asset outages can lead to different pricing and 
market outcomes.  
The aforementioned issues create a need for detailed 
examination of the objective function design for the stochastic 
market models. An alternative option for ESCUC is to 
minimize only the base-case costs including generator 
production costs, the startup costs, and the shutdown costs as 
shown in (37), with the same set of constraints as (25)-(35). 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑔
𝑝𝑃𝑔0𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑁𝐿𝑢𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝑈𝑣𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑔
𝑆𝐷𝑤𝑔𝑡)𝑡𝑔  (37) 
The above model for stochastic market is called ESCUC-base 
market model throughout this paper. This model minimized 
(37) while searching for a feasible solution for pre- and post-
contingency states. This paper proposes a framework to identify 
an effective stochastic market design by comparing two 
ESCUC models, i.e., ESCUC-expected and ESCUC-base, from 
the aforementioned aspects. The detailed analyses are presented 
in the following sub-sections.  
A. Realized N-1 final operating cost  
As discussed, intention during an emergency condition is not 
to minimize cost; rather, the goal is to recover from the event as 
quickly as possible by minimizing violation. In this section, 
contingency analysis with violation minimization is performed, 
which mimics the operator’s actions in emergency conditions. 
The realized N-1 operating costs for the two ESCUC models are 
calculated using the dispatch from contingency analysis tool; 
these costs reflect the corrective generation dispatch actions 
after the N-1 contingencies. Then, the realized N-1 costs for the 
dispatch from two ESCUC models are compared.  Fig. 5 
demonstrates the procedure performed for this analysis.   
Market solutions
Model 1: ESCUC-base Model 2: ESCUC-expected 
Realized N-1 cost of model 2 
N-1 contingency analysis (violation minimization)
Realized N-1 cost of model 1 
Compare actual realized N-1 
costs of model 1 & 2 
 
Fig. 5: Procedure of comparison of two models for actual realized N-1 costs. 
The N-1 contingency analysis tool is a linear programming 
problem which is solved independently at each time period 𝑡 for 
each operating state 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑔, 𝐶𝑘. The formulation for 
contingency analysis is given below. 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∑ (𝐿𝑆𝑛
+ + 𝐿𝑆𝑛
−)𝑛  (39) 
−𝑃𝑔 ≤ (𝑟?̅? − ?̅?𝑔)?̅?𝑔𝑁1𝑔, ∀𝑔 (40) 
𝑃𝑔 ≤ (𝑟?̅? + ?̅?𝑔)?̅?𝑔𝑁1𝑔, ∀𝑔 (41) 
𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛?̅?𝑔𝑁1𝑔 ≤ 𝑃𝑔 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥?̅?𝑔𝑁1𝑔, ∀𝑔 (42) 
𝑃𝑛
𝑖𝑛𝑗 = ∑ 𝑃𝑔 − 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑛 + 𝐿𝑆𝑛
+ − 𝐿𝑆𝑛
−
𝑔∈𝑔(𝑛) , ∀𝑛 (43) 
∑ 𝑃𝑛
𝑖𝑛𝑗 = 0𝑛  (44) 
−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐𝑁1𝑘 ≤ ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑛𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑃𝑛
𝑖𝑛𝑗 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐𝑁1𝑘𝑛 , ∀𝑘 (45) 
𝐿𝑆𝑛
−, 𝐿𝑆𝑛
+ ≥ 0, ∀𝑛 (46) 
Positive slack variables, i.e., 𝐿𝑆𝑛
− for load shedding and 𝐿𝑆𝑛
+ 
for load surplus, indicate the post-contingency security 
violations. Consequently, the contingency analysis objective 
(39) is to minimize the load shed and the load surplus, when an 
outage occurs. Constraints (40) and (41) restrict the deviation 
of the power generation from the pre-contingency to the post-
contingency by the scheduled reserve obtained from the DA 
ESCUC models. The generator output limit constraint in post-
contingency state is represented by (42). The node balance 
constraint in the post-contingency state is ensured by (43), 
while (44) ensures power balance at system level. Constraint 
(45) limits the post-contingency transmission line flows to be 
within the emergency limits for generation and transmission 
contingencies. In model (39)-(46), only one 𝑁1𝑘 and 𝑁1𝑔 is set 
to zero while the rest of 𝑁1𝑘 and 𝑁1𝑔 are equal to one. 
B. Impacts of imprecise estimation in probabilities 
The second issue that should be investigated when it comes 
to design of a stochastic market model is the implications of 
inaccuracy in the estimation of probability of outages. These 
analyses are also very necessary to be performed as it is difficult 
to exactly estimate the probability of outages, which itself can 
lead to different pricing implications and market solutions. In 
order to realize the impact of this inaccuracy, procedure shown 
in Fig. 6 is proposed in this paper.  
Market solutions
Model 1: ESCUC-base Model 2: ESCUC-expected 
Generate cases via monte Carlo simulation:
Error in probabilities
Compare new costs of model 
1 & 2 
New costs of model 2 due 
to probabilities modification 
New costs of model 1 due 
to probabilities modification 
 
Fig. 6: Procedure of analysis of imprecise probabilities estimation. 
C. Testing & Results of objective function design   
IEEE 118-bus test system that was explained in detail at 
section III.A is used to perform the simulations. First, ESCUC-
base and ESCUC-expected models are solved with relative MIP 
gap set to 0% to compare their benchmark solutions. The 
formulations are evaluated based on DA operational scheduling 
cost and the realized operation cost during N-1 contingency 
scenarios (i.e., contingency analysis with violation 
minimization). Fig. 7 (a) compares the two different costs, i.e., 
original costs versus realized N-1 costs for two market auction 
models. It is clear that the original DA expected costs of the 
ESCUC-expected model are lower than those of ESCUC-base 
model, as the objective function of the ESCUC-expected is to 
minimize the costs over all scenarios while the ESCUC-base 
minimizes just the base-case costs. However, the realized N-1 
costs of two models are almost the same (the difference is only 
0.002 percent). These results reveal that minimizing post-
contingency costs in the ESCUC-expected does not represent 
operators’ actions and may not result in lower N-1 realized costs 
in the emergency conditions. Similar results are obtained when 
the scenario costs of the two models are compared as shown in 
Fig. 7 (b). It is pertinent to note that the scenario costs include 
the expected variable cost of generators for post-contingency 
scenarios (all scenarios excluding the base-case scenario).   
Moreover, the industry practice of considering a non-zero 
MIP gap is implemented here to achieve 30 various solutions 
(all within 1% MIP gap) for the two ESCUC models, for the 
sake of further comparison. By pairing the solutions of two 
ESCUC models, the total number of pairs is equal to 
30×30=900, each of which includes a possible markets 
outcome from two different models to be compared.  
Table I lists the percentage of pairs that the ESCUC-base 
model results in lower cost compared to ESCUC-expected. It 
can be observed that, as expected, the DA base-case cost of 
ESCUC-base is lower in 85 percent of pairs compared to the 
ESCUC-expected model. Fig. 8 (a) presents the histogram of 
costs difference calculated from subtracting the base-cost cost 
of ESCUC-base from that of ESCUC-expected. It can be seen 
that the density of the pairs cost difference tends to be toward 
positive values. Moreover, Table I presents that the original DA 
expected costs of ESCUC-base are lower in 30 percent of the 
pairs as expected (see Fig. 8 (b) for histogram illustration of 
difference in original DA expected costs). Finally, Table I 
shows that in almost 86 percent of pairs, the realized N-1 costs 
of ESCUC-base model are less than those of ESCUC-expected 
model during N-1 contingency scenarios. Fig. 8 (c) illustrates 
realized N-1 costs difference (i.e., realized {𝑁 −
1} costsESCUC−𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 − realized {𝑁 − 1} costsESCUC−𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒) 
for the 900 pairs.  
TABLE I: PERCENTAGE OF PAIRS WITH LOWER COST FOR ESCUC-BASE MODEL 
COMPARED TO ESCUC-EXPECTED MODEL. 
Type of cost Percentage 
DA base-case costs 85% 
Original DA expected costs 30% 
Realized N-1 costs (violation minimization) 86% 
The summarized results in Table I as well as Fig. 8 confirm 
that the realized N-1 costs from the DA dispatch solution of 
ESCUC-base are lower than the realized N-1 costs of ESCUC-
expected in most of the pairs regardless of N-1 cost 
minimization in the ESCUC-expected. Moreover, the base-case 
costs of ESCUC-base are lower than those of the ESCUC-
expected in the most of  pairs. As one can see, the ESCUC-base 
performs better in general compared to the ESCUC-expected 
model based on the base-case costs and realized N-1 final costs.  
Moreover, the impact of inaccuracy in the contingency 
probability estimation is evaluated. It is assumed that there is 
an error in the estimation of probabilities that follows a 
Gaussian distribution with zero mean, and the standard 
deviation of 20% and 40%. For each standard deviation, 2000 
cases are generated, each of which includes a set of 231 
contingency probabilities (for generator and non-radial 
transmission line contingencies). Then, the probability of base 
case is calculated through following equation.   
𝜋𝐵𝐶,𝑠 = 1 − ∑ 𝜋𝑐,𝑠𝑐∈𝐶𝑘 − ∑ 𝜋𝑐,𝑠𝑐∈𝐶𝐺 , ∀𝑠 (47) 
where 𝑠 is the index of cases, and 𝜋𝐵𝐶,𝑠 and 𝜋𝑐,𝑠 are 
probability of base-case scenario and contingency event 𝑐 in 
case 𝑠. Since the range of probability of base-case scenario is 
more known for the system operators for a specific electric 
system, the cases that lead to a base-case probability out of the 
range 0.948 and 0.944 have been eliminated (perfect estimation 
has a base-case probability of 0.946). The 2000 cases are 
applied based on the procedure presented in Fig. 6 to each of 
the 30 solutions of ESCUC-base and ESCUC-expected models 
mentioned earlier. Therefore, there is 30×2000=60,000 
solutions (costs) for each market model.  By pairing the 
solutions of two different stochastic market model, total number 
of pairs is equal to 3,600,000,000, i.e., 60,000×60,000. It is 
worth mentioning that each pair has two market outcomes, one 
from ESCUC-base model and one from ESCUC-expected that 
can be compared.  
TABLE II: EFFECTS OF ERROR IN ESTIMATION OF PROBABILITIES ON 
PERCENTAGE OF PAIRS THAT ESCUC-BASE MODEL HAS LOWER COST 
COMPARED TO ESCUC-EXPECTED MODEL. 
 Perfect 
estimation 
20% error in 
estimation 
40% error 
estimation 
% of pairs with lower 
original expected cost  
30 36.6 43.0 
% of pairs with lower 
scenario cost 
0 7.8 22.2 
Table II presents the impacts of error in estimation of 
probabilities on the percentage of the pairs that ESCUC-base 
model has lower cost (original expected cost and scenario cost) 
compared to the ESCUC-expected model. From Table II, it can 
be seen that the percentage of pairs where ESCUC-base model 
has lower original expected cost increase from 30% to 36.6% 
and 43% as the accuracy in estimation of probabilities moves 
from being perfect to have 20% and 40% estimation errors, 
respectively. The percentage of pairs in which the ESCUC-base 
model has lower scenario cost in comparison with the other 
model increases from 0% for perfect estimation to 7.8% and 
22.2% for 20% and 40% error in estimation, respectively. These 
results demonstrate that after the solutions of two models are 
affected by the inaccuracy in probabilities estimation, the 
                                    
                                       (a)                                                                                  (b)                                                                                  (c) 
Fig. 8: Histogram of cost difference (𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡ESCUC−𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡ESCUC−𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒) of the pairs: (a) base-case costs (b) original expected costs (c) realized N-1 costs. 
 
                         (a)                                                          (b) 
Fig. 7: Cost comparison for N-1 reliable solutions obtained from ESCUC-
expected and ESCUC-base models: (a) expected costs (b) scenario costs. 
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likelihood that ESCUC-base outperforms the other model in 
having less original expected cost and scenario cost increases. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A comprehensive framework incorporating various 
procedures was proposed in this paper to: (i) conduct a fair 
comparison of pricing and settlements between different market 
models that ensure different levels of security, and (ii) examine 
efficient objective formulation for stochastic market design. 
To compare various market models: (i) the concept of 
securitized LMP was developed for ESCUC model, (ii) an 
OMC procedure was implemented on the solution of market 
models with proxy reserve requirement and with LODF to 
obtain N-1 reliable dispatch. The ISO practice of calculating 
market settlements based on the original market prices and N-1 
reliable schedule after performing OMC was implemented. 
Newly committed generators during OMC do not have direct 
impact on the value of LMP for their location. At this stage, it 
is unclear whether this mechanism (a SCUC model following 
with OMC) enables opportunities for market exploitation. 
Using this mechanism, the market model is not purely a pool; 
instead, it is a combination of a pool and pay-as-bid model. This 
practice is limited and not transparent for all market 
participants; therefore, the market participants will not change 
their bidding strategy accordingly (as they would in a pay-as-
bid model). Although this is an accepted market manipulation, 
some participants might receive less than deserved benefits and 
some might receive more. However, with more accurate 
representation of contingencies in the ESCUC compared to 
SCUC models with approximation on N-1 security criteria, N-1 
grid security requirements are originally captured, thereby, the 
value of service (contingency-based reserve) provided by 
generators is reflected in the LMPs to achieve grid security. In 
other words, if the market SCUC includes the reliability criteria 
more adequately, prices can better reflect the true marginal cost 
associated with the provision of the reliable electricity.  
Furthermore, it was shown that the stochastic market design 
with expected objective function does not give solutions that 
ensure minimum realized operating costs at N-1 contingency 
states. Instead, the stochastic market design with base-case 
objective function had better performance compared to the 
market model with expected objective function in terms of the 
base-case costs and realized N-1 costs. Moreover, inaccuracy in 
estimated probability results in larger differences in the original 
DA expected costs and the costs of scenarios of ESCUC-base 
and ESCUC-expected, where ESCUC-base further outperforms 
ESCUC-expected. It can be concluded that evidently the 
stochastic market design with base-case objective function can 
be more efficient compared to the stochastic market design with 
expected objective function. 
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